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Introduction
The general rule in United States federal courts is that each party
bears the cost of its own attorney.1 Although developed early in Ameri-
can judicial history,2 this rule is not absolute. Exceptions to the rule fall
into three main categories: legislative, judicial, and contractual. While
there is no general statutory scheme for awarding attorney's fees, Con-
gress has enacted legislation either allowing or requiring courts to award
attorney's fees in specific situations.' Federal courts have the inherent
power to assess attorney's fees for punitive purposes,4 and courts may
also grant fees under their rules of procedure.5 Finally, where a valid
contract provision allows for attorney's fees, courts will uphold the pro-
vision and award fees.6
The Copyright Act7 contains an exception to the general rule and
authorizes courts to award attorney's fees.8 This provision, 17 U.S.C.
§ 505, states that
1. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) ("In the United States,
the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the
loser." Id. at 247. "[Rlecent cases have ... reaffirmed the general rule that, absent statute or
enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys' fees." Id. at 257 (citations omitted)).
2. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). In deciding whether attorney's
fees should be includable as damages, the United States Supreme Court stated, "The general
practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not strictly
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed or modified, by
statute." Id. at 306 (emphasis in the original). For criticism of this general rule, see, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792
(1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75
(1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages,
15 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of
Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included
in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees:
Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967) (authored by James H.
Check i1); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 636, 648-55 (1974) (authored by Margaret Annabel De Lisser).
3. For a list of federal statutes that allow or require courts to award attorney's fees, see
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33; Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Rea-
sonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 303 n.104 (1977).
4. Courts have the inherent power to assess attorney's fees for the "willful disobedience
of a court order ... as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant," Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923), or when the losing party has "acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel.
Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
5. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11, 16(f), 26(g), 30(g), 37(a)(4), 37(b), 37(c), 37(d), 37(g).
Attorney's fees may be awarded under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a sanction for
failure to adhere to the rules or to a court order pursuant to the rules.
6. See, e.g., Bosko v. Pitts & Still, Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 856, 454 P.2d 229 (1969).
7. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988)).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988). Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 501-510) is
entitled "Copyright Infringement and Remedies." Some of the other listed remedies are as
1991]
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[i]n any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by
this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.
9
I
General Application and Provisions of the Statute
Fees may be awarded in any civil action' ° brought under the Copy-
right Act. Such actions may include not only suits for copyright in-
fringement," but also suits to declare a copyright invalid' 2 or to decide
which party has the right to renew a copyright.'3 Section 505 is also
applicable to suits that are brought only in part under the Copyright
Act, 14 decided in arbitration,' 5 settled prior to judgment, 6 or voluntarily
follows: § 502 (injunctions); § 503 (impounding and disposition of infringing articles); § 504
(damage and profits).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 505. The portion of the statute dealing with attorney's fees has remained
unchanged since 1909. The statute was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 116 from 1909 to 1976, when it
was recodified at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988)). Throughout this
Article, the statute will be referred to as § 505, regardless of the date of the case.
10. Under the Copyright Act, fees are not available in criminal proceedings. Id.
11. See Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1985); Oboler v. Goldin,
714 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1983); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); M.S.R.
Imports, Inc. v. R.E. Greenspan Co., 574 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Moorish Vanguard
Concert v. Brown, 498 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
12. Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958).
13. Rose v. Bourne, Inc., 279 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 880 (1960); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
820 (1947); Austin v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 776, 780 (N.D. I11. 1962) (court could have
awarded fees but chose not to); Bourne Co. v. MPL Comm., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1988). The right to renew a copyright is not the source of litigation it once was. Under the
current version of the Copyright Act, only copyrights that were in their first term as of Janu-
ary 1, 1978 are subject to renewal. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1988). All other copyrights are now
entitled to a substantially longer nonrenewable term. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (1988).
14. Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1984) (copyright
infringement, invasion of privacy, and defamation); Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (copyright and patent infringement); Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 228 F.2d
221 (2d Cir. 1955) (copyright infringement and unfair competition), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996
(1956); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 785 (1944) (copyright and trademark infringement and unfair competition).
When a case is brought only in part under the Copyright Act and fees are awarded, some
courts have apportioned the work performed and have granted separate fee awards for each
aspect of the case. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 797 F.2d 70, 77 (2d
Cir. 1986) (fees apportioned and separately awarded under the Copyright Act and the Lanham
Act). Other courts have chosen not to require such explicit apportionment. See, e.g., Transgo,
Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1025-28 (9th Cir. 1985) (unapportioned
lump sum fee awarded jointly under the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, and the court's
inherent equity power).
15. Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F,2d 228 (2d Cir. 1982).
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dismissed." This statute is not applicable to suits or claims that do not
arise under the Copyright Act.I s In addition, parties are not entitled to
attorney's fees as a matter of right. 9 However, a state may be held liable
for attorney's fees under this provision despite eleventh amendment sov-
ereign immunity.2 °
Section 505 contains three elements: 1) the court has the discretion
to award or not to award attorney's fees; 2) the amount awarded must be
reasonable; and 3) only the prevailing party may be awarded fees.21
These elements may be restated as issues or questions: 1) when may a
court properly exercise its discretion to award fees and what is the extent
of the court's discretion?; 2) what constitutes a reasonable amount?; and
3) who is the prevailing party? These three questions must be addressed
by the court whenever attorney's fees are requested under the Copyright
Act.
Because the statute expressly allows the court to award fees "in its
discretion," the standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.22
16. Balcaen v. Herschberger, 415 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The plaintiff was
awarded costs and fees after the parties had settled. The district court held that in a settle-
ment, whether or not the parties expressly agreed on the matter of fees or costs, the "prevailing
party" is entitled to costs and may be awarded fees. The "prevailing party" is not limited to
include only parties who prevail after a trial on the merits. Id. at 334-35.
17. Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 788
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986). After instituting the suit, the plaintiff requested, and was granted,
permission to withdraw the complaint. The defendant's request for fees was granted because it
was found to have "prevailed" and was otherwise entitled to the fees.
18. See, e.g., Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 1989) (award of fees
under the Copyright Act reversed because the claims did not arise under the Copyright Act);
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 528 (10th Cir. 1987) (award of fees under
the Copyright Act reversed because the claims were for infringement of unregistered trade-
mark and unfair competition-there were no copyright claims); Diamond v. Am-Law Pub-
lishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 1984) (attorney's fees awarded under § 505 are
limited to "service rendered in defense of the copyright claim"); Landsberg v. Scrabble Cross-
word Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1984) (claims did not arise under the
Copyright Act); Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 626 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (case did not involve a copyright claim, so fees could not be awarded under the
Copyright Act).
19. Buck v. Bilkie, 63 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1933); Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,
189 F.2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1951).
20. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
21. In Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 137 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
the court incorrectly stated that "the losing party may be awarded the [attorney's] fee." In
actuality, the losing party may be awarded costs but not attorney's fees. In Kepner-Tregoe,
however, no fees were awarded. Id. at 139.
22. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assoc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281 n.7 (6th Cir.
1988); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988); Readers Di-
gest Ass'n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Casella v. Morris,
820 F.2d 362 (11th Cir. 1987); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986);
Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1985); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Trans-
mission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985); Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754
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Case law, however, shows that this "discretion" has been defined by
courts in a wide variety of ways, which often conflict. Some courts have
given the term a very broad definition, allowing the district court to
render a decision regarding attorney's fees within a wide range of accept-
able possibilities.23 Other courts have severely restricted the district
court's latitude by defining the term very narrowly and by adopting strict
standards or guidelines for the award or denial of fees.24
This Article focuses on what is meant by the term "discretion" as
contained in 17 U.S.C. § 505. To determine which standard better con-
forms with the statutory provision,25 this Article analyzes how this term
has been judicially interpreted by the various circuits26 and then recom-
mends the preferable standard. 27 Finally, this Article discusses various
other issues raised by the statute, such as attorney's fees on appeal, find-
ings necessary to support an award of fees, and the statute's interaction
with other provisions of the Copyright Act.28
The problems inherent in determining the reasonableness of the
amount of the award, in deciding who constitutes the prevailing party,
and in awarding costs are beyond the scope of this paper, but are dis-
cussed in relation to the standard as to when fees should be awarded.
The law regarding attorney's fees in noncopyright cases is discussed only
for comparative purposes or as an aid in interpreting copyright law. 29
II
Circuits That Have Developed Comprehensive
Standards
Because the award of attorney's fees is discretionary, courts have
adopted standards that guide the exercise of this discretion. These stan-
dards have been devised in an attempt to avoid arbitrary decisions, to
lend consistency and fairness to awards, and to accomplish the purpose
F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1985); Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1984); Hughes v. Novi
Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
23. See sections II(B) and II(C) infra.
24. See section II(A) infra.
25. The case law to be discussed is exclusively federal. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) states,
in relevant part, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to... copyrights .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive
of the courts of the states in ... copyright cases."
26. See Parts II and III infra.
27. See Part V infra.
28. See Part IV infra.
29. The Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), and the Patent Act,
codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988), the bodies of law most analogous to the Copyright Act,
both state that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); 35 U.S.C. § 285.
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of the statute. Because Congress has given no guidance in the statute
30
or in the legislative history3 as to what standard should be followed or as
to the purpose of the statute, and since the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue,32 the various circuit courts of appeals have had to de-
cide what standard to follow. Unfortunately, the circuits that have
expressly adopted a standard have interpreted the statute differently, cre-
ating three standards that cannot be reconciled. As a result, there is a
striking lack of uniformity among the circuits. The three different stan-
dards may be denoted and referred to as the "double standard" of the
Second and Ninth Circuits,3 3 the "express interpretation standard" of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 34 and the "balancing standard" of the Third
Circuit.3 5 The remaining circuits have either expressly declined to adopt
a comprehensive standard36 or have not yet addressed the issue.3 7
A. The "Double Standard" of the Second and Ninth Circuits
1. The Second Circuit
In Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Co.,38 the Second Circuit ex-
pressly adopted a "double standard," treating prevailing plaintiffs differ-
ently from prevailing defendants. 39 The court determined that the
purpose of section 505 is two-fold: 1) to deter infringement; and 2) to
30. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988). See supra text accompanying note 9 for text of the statute.
Congress assumed the term "discretion" to be self-defining and left its interpretation to the
courts.
31. The legislative history of § 505 states in full: "Under section 505 the awarding of
costs and attorney's fees are left to the court's discretion, and the section also makes clear that
neither costs nor attorney's fees can be awarded to or against 'the United States or an officer
thereof.'" H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 163, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5779, 5779.
32. Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 620 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd,
788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
33. See section II(A) infra.
34. See section II(B) infra.
35. See section II(C) infra.
36. Several circuits have expressly acknowledged the division among the circuits, but have
so far declined to adopt a comprehensive standard. See, e.g., International Korwin Corp. v.
Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117
(8th Cir. 1987); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir.
1987); M.C.A., Inc. v. Parks, 796 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986).
37. The First, Fourth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have not addressed or acknowledged
the division among the circuits.
38. 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. "[A] distinction exists between the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff and an award
to a prevailing defendant." Id. at 148. This double standard has been restated in subsequent
cases. See, e.g., Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The determination of
whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees depends, in part, upon
whether the plaintiff or defendant prevails.").
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encourage the assertion of colorable claims.' The Second Circuit did
not see the statute as merely compensating the prevailing party and pun-
ishing the losing party, but rather as compensating the prevailing plaintiff
and punishing the losing defendant.4 ' Consequently, "The determination
of whether a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
depends in part upon whether the plaintiff or defendant prevails."42 Re-
gardless of which party prevails, fees need not be granted "if the award
would not vindicate [the] underlying statutory policies or... would be
inequitable."43
In line with this rather one-sided interpretation of the purpose of the
statute, the Second Circuit's standard for awarding attorneys' fees is also
skewed in favor of the plaintiff. The standard for the prevailing plaintiff
is quite lenient-fees are generally' awarded "as a matter of course."45
The rationale is that a fee award- to the prevailing plaintiff satisfies the
purported purpose of the statute.46 It has been held that attorneys' fees
are "particularly appropriate where plaintiff is a small business."47 The
"willfulness" or "deliberateness" of infringement is the most common
reason given by the courts when awarding fees to the prevailing
plaintiff.4"
40. Diamond, 745 F.2d at 148; Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1093
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
41. Earlier cases in the Second Circuit state the purpose of the statute in other terms. See,
e.g., Oboler v. Goldin, 714 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1983) (to assure equal access to the courts,
provide economic incentive to challenge infringement, or penalize the losing party); Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf& Western Corp., 534 F. Supp. 606, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (to penalize
the losing party, deter infringement, or punish the losing plaintiff for instituting a suit that is
baseless, frivolous, unreasonable, or brought in bad faith); Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co., 271 F.
Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (to deter infringement by defendant or to penalize the plaintiff
"for institution of a baseless, frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one instituted in bad faith").
42. Golden Torch Music Corp. v. Pier III Cafe, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 772, 774 (D. Conn.
1988).
43. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1989).
44. See, e.g., Roth, 787 F.2d at 57; Diamond, 745 F.2d at 148.
45. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1989).
46. "Because § 505 is intended in part to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright
claims and to deter infringement, fees are generally awarded to prevailing plaintiffs." Dia-
mond, 745 F.2d at 148; see also Roth, 787 F.2d at 57.
47. Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
48. See Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Wow & Flut-
ter Music v. Len's Tom Jones Tavern, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 554, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); R.S.O.
Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Fallaci v. The New Gazette
Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton
Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co., 271
F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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There are, however, circumstances under which a prevailing plain-
tiff would not be awarded attorney's fees.49 The most often cited reason
for denying a prevailing plaintiff attorney's fees is that the suit involved a
novel, complex, or unsettled area of the law.50 Other reasons for denying
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff include the following: the good
faith of the defendants; 51 innocent rather than willful infringement by the
defendant;52 the bad faith of the plaintiff in bringing or pursuing the
suit;53 the good faith attempt by the defendant to avoid infringement;5 4 a
defense not designed to annoy or harass the plaintiff;55 defense not so
lacking in merit as to present no arguable question of law or fact;56 and
the plaintiff's unreasonable demands for damages and fees. 7
In contrast, a prevailing defendant bears a "heavier burden"5 " and is
generally not awarded attorney's fees because such an award does not
comport with the stated purpose of the statute.59 There are, however,
instances in which a prevailing defendant has been awarded fees in the
Second Circuit. The prevailing defendant may be awarded fees when the
plaintiff acts in bad faith," or asserts claims that are objectively without
49. See generally Golden Torch Music Corp. v. Pier III Cafe, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 772, 774
(D. Conn. 1988) (citing McCulloch v. Albert F. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987)).
50. See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubies Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1989) (the
issue was characterized as "difficult"); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684
F.2d 228, 231 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982); Bourne Co. v. M.P.L. Comm., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 70, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247, 1252
(W.D.N.Y. 1983); Boz Scaggs Music v. K.N.D. Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 915 (D. Conn. 1980);
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Apollo Records, 300 F. Supp. 32, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
51. See, e.g., Abeshouse v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 473 (2d Cir. 1985) (defend-
ant diligently pursued settlement with plaintiff); Warnei Bros. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877
F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1989); Bourne Co., 678 F. Supp. at 72; Boz Scaggs, 491 F. Supp. at
915.
52. See, e.g., Abeshouse, 754 F.2d at 473 (defendant # 1 held liable for attorney's fees, but
defendant #2 not held liable for fees because he had acted only at the directions of defendant
# 1); Dolori Fabrics, Inc., v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (fees
awarded against defendant # I because of "deliberate" infringement, but not against defendant
#2, who had "unintentionally" infringed); Boz Scaggs, 491 F. Supp. at 915.
53. See, e.g., Warner Bro, 877 F.2d at 1128 (2d Cir. 1989); Boz Scaggs, 491 F. Supp. at
915; Leo Feist, 300 F. Supp. at 43.
54. See, e.g., Boz Scaggs 491 F. Supp. at 915.
55. See, e.g., Leo Feist, 300 F. Supp. at 43; Morser v. Bengor Prod. Co., 283 F. Supp. 926,
929 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Norbay Music, Inc. v. King Records, 249 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
56. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 558 F. Supp.
1247, 1252 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Leo Feist, 300 F. Supp. at 43; Morser, 283 F. Supp. at 929.
57. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Dae Rim Trading, 877 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1989).
58. Id.
59. Roth v. Pritkin, 787 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1986); Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf &
Western Corp., 534 F. Supp. 606, 610 n.I (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
60. Grosset, 534 F. Supp. at 610; Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623, 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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merit,6 synthetic, capricious, unreasonable,62 baseless, or frivolous.63
When a defendant prevails, the plaintiff's suit is rarely found to be in bad
faith, but may be held to be unreasonable."
2. The Ninth Circuit
In a 1987 case, McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc.,65 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held for the first time that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defend-
ants are to be treated differently. Prior to this decision, case law gave
every indication that plaintiffs and defendants were to be treated simi-
larly. The court had held that the sole determining factor in awarding
attorney's fees was the presence or absence of bad faith on the part of the
losing party. An award of fees was contingent upon a finding of bad
faith, regardless which party prevailed.
a. Case Law Prior to McCulloch
In Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc.,66 the
court stated, "Although in some other circuits, an award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in a copyright case does not require a finding
of bad faith,.. . we predicate an award under 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982) on
such a finding."6 7 Although the defendant prevailed in Cooling Systems,
the court did not differentiate between parties in its statement of the law.
This lack of a distinction between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants
continued in several later cases.
61. Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984); Whimsical-
ity, Inc. v. Rubies Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1988).
62. Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 457; Mailer v. R.K.O. Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 332 F.2d
747, 749 (2d Cir. 1964).
63. Roth, 787 F.2d at 57; Grosset, 534 F. Supp. at 610; Brefort, 271 F. Supp. at 627.
64. See, e.g., Mailer, 332 F.2d at 749.
[The plaintiff's] claim was neither "synthetic" nor "capricious," .... it was "unrea-
sonable." . . . (The plaintiff] "had a legal argument. Whether he had an argument
which was good as a matter of conscience is open to more doubt."
... [This suit] represented an attempt by [the plaintiff] to employ a highly tech-
nical argument as a means of extracting a grossly unfair penalty assessment from the
defendants.
Id. (Although the Mailer Court claims to be quoting the district court's opinion (213 F. Supp.
294 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Dawson, J.)), these words do not appear in the reported version. How-
ever, there is a reference to a damages hearing on page 749 of the Mailer opinion, which may
be the source of the quoted material.); see also Diamond, 745 F.2d at 149 (the appellate court
accepted the trial court's characterization that the plaintiff's copyright claim had no reason-
able legal basis).
65. 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987).
66. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 493 (citations omitted).
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In Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc. 68 and Lifshitz v.
Walter Drake & Sons, Inc.,69 the defendants prevailed, but fees were de-
nied because the plaintiffs' claims were not brought in bad faith.7" Both
cases restated the general rule of Cooling Systems: an award of fees is
predicated on a finding of bad faith.7 The court made no distinction
between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. Fees were also denied to
the prevailing defendants in See v. Durang72 and Jartech, Inc. v.
Clancy.73 In the former, the plaintiff's argument was not so weak as to
be considered frivolous,74 and in the latter, the plaintiff's suit was not
brought in bad faith or meant to harass defendant.7"
The plaintiffs prevailed in Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts
Corp.76 and Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's, Inc. 7 7 and were awarded fees.
The court specifically stated that fees were awarded because of defend-
ants' bad faith.7' No mention was made that fees could be awarded to a
prevailing plaintiff in the absence of bad faith.
b. McCulloch's Double Standard
The court adopted its double standard in McCulloch, when the los-
ing defendant appealed the district court's award of fees to the prevailing
plaintiff without any finding that defendant had acted in bad faith.79 The
court distinguished Cooling Systems and its neutral, evenhanded state-
68. 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987).
69. 806 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1986).
70. Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 980; Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1435.
71. Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 980 ("The award of costs and attorney fees under 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 is predicated upon a finding of bad faith or frivolity." (citing Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1435
and Cooling Sys., 777 F.2d at 493)); Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1435 ("The award of costs and
attorneys' fees under this section is predicated upon a finding of bad faith or frivolity." (citing
Cooling Sys., 777 F.2d at 493)).
72. 711 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1983).
73. 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982). In Jartech, the court stated, "When attorney's fees are
awarded to a prevailing defendant, the award represents a penalty for the institution of a frivo-
lous or bad faith suit." Id. at 407. Although this holding refers specifically to prevailing
defendants, it does not state that an award of fees to the prevailing plaintiff is subject to any
different standard.
74. Durang, 711 F.2d at 144.
75. Jartech, 666 F.2d at 407.
76. 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985).
77. 673 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
78. Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1027 ("IThe district court awarded attorney's fees because it
found that [defendant] appellants acted in bad faith.... Our review of the record convinces us
that the court and jury did not err. The district court did not abuse its discretion."); Spec-
travest, 673 F. Supp. at 1493 (Defendant contended that it was an innocent infringer and had
no knowledge of plaintiff's copyright, but the evidence showed this to be untrue-defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge of plaintiff's copyright. "On this basis, [the] Court
award[ed] reasonable costs and attorney's fees to plaintiff." Id.).
79. McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1987).
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ment of the law by pointing out that in Cooling Systems the defendant
had prevailed rather than the plaintiff.8" Even though the question was
not before the court, the court specifically reaffirmed its position that bad
faith is required before fees can be granted to a prevailing defendant.8
To justify its adoption of a different standard for prevailing plain-
tiffs, the McCulloch court relied on authority from other circuits. The
court quoted the Eleventh Circuit's holding that a" 'showing of bad faith
or frivolity is not a requirement of a grant of fees' to a prevailing plain-
tiff." 2 The Eleventh Circuit actually had held that bad faith was not a
prerequisite to an award of fees no matter which party prevailed.83 As
will be discussed, the Eleventh Circuit treats prevailing plaintiffs and de-
fendants equally and does not predicate an award to either party on a
showing of bad faith.84
The McCulloch court then adopted the Second Circuit's determina-
tion of the purpose of section 505, which leads to the result that "fees are
generally awarded to a prevailing plaintiff."8 " Finally, the court cited the
Third Circuit's holding that a prevailing plaintiff should not be awarded
fees in every case.86 However, the Third Circuit case cited for this prop-
osition, Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc.,87 expressly and quite strongly
rejected in its entirety the notion of treating plaintiffs and defendants
differently. 8
The position adopted in McCulloch is very similar to the Second
Circuit's position. Fees are awarded to a prevailing defendant only if the
plaintiff acts in bad faith. Fees are generally awarded to the prevailing
plaintiff, but may be withheld under several circumstances: there is a
complex or novel issue of law that the defendant litigates vigorously and
80. Id.
81. Id. ("[A]n award of attorney's fees to a defendant under section 505 must be predi-
cated on a finding of bad faith or frivolity.... When attorney's fees are awarded to a prevailing
defendant, the award represents a penalty for the institution of a frivolous or bad faith suit."
(quoting Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982)).
82. Id. (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832
(11th Cir. 1982))).
83. The quotation in more complete form is as follows: "[A] showing of bad faith or
frivolity is not a requirement of a grant of fees. Rather, the only preconditions to an award of
fees is that the party receiving the fee be the 'prevailing party' and that the fee be reasonable."
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 684 F.2d at 832.
84. See infra section II(B).
85. McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 323. The purpose of the statute was found to be three-fold: to
encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter infringement, and to make the
plaintiff whole. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 105-11 and infra section II(C).
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in good faith; the defendant is an "innocent" rather than willful in-
fringer; the plaintiff prosecuted in bad faith; or the defendant made a
good faith attempt to avoid infringement.8 9
Since McCulloch, the statement that "fees are generally awarded to
a prevailing plaintiff'"90 has been expanded. The statement now implies,
"Plaintiffs in copyright actions may be awarded attorney's fees simply by
virtue of prevailing in the action: no other precondition need be met,
although the fee awarded must be reasonable." '91 Most recently, in Bib-
bero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc.,92 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
denial of fees to the prevailing defendant, finding that the plaintiff had
not acted in bad faith.93 When asked to "abandon its distinction between
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants," the court reaffirmed its
double standard stating it was bound by precedent.94
3. Analysis of the "Double Standard"
It is not clear how a defendant who prevails on a counterclaim is
treated under the double standard. Does the standard for prevailing de-
fendants apply or is the party treated as a plaintiff for purposes of the
counterclaim? What about the case in which the defendant is the copy-
right owner? Treating the plaintiff preferentially because it advances the
purpose of the statute assumes that the plaintiff is the copyright owner.95
If the defendant is the owner of the copyright, freely granting fees to the
plaintiff would not "encourage suits to redress copyright infringe-
ment." 96 Given the disparate standards applicable to plaintiffs and de-
fendants, the answers to these questions could be dispositive as to
whether fees are awarded to the prevailing party.
These issues are raised in the Second Circuit case of Universal City
Studios v. Nintendo Co., 97 but, because of the specific facts of the case,
resolution of the questions was not necessary, or even addressed. In its
counterclaim, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had vicariously in-
fringed its copyright, and after the plaintiff's claims were disrhissed, de-
fendant prevailed on its counterclaim. Defendant was awarded
89. McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 322-23.
90. Id. at 323.
91. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989).
92. 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990).
93. Id. at 1108.
94. Id. at 1109.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
96. As stated in Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1986), "Because the Copyright
Act is intended to' encourage suits to redress copyright infringement, fees are generally
awarded to a prevailing plaintiff."
97. 797 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1986).
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attorney's fees,9" because the plaintiff was found to have acted in bad
faith by asserting claims it knew to be baseless, harassing third-party
licensees of defendant's copyright, and using "litigation and the threat of
litigation merely to obtain quick settlement payments from third parties,
and not to bring its claims to definitive adjudication." 99 Because the
plaintiff's claims had been dismissed in a prior proceeding, it is clear that
the defendant was awarded fees for prevailing on its counterclaim rather
than for successfully defending against the plaintiff's claims.1ic
Although the court in Nintendo did not state its basis for awarding
fees, other than to say that "the findings noted above" support such an
award,10 ' the facts of the case would have allowed for a fee award
whether defendant was characterized as a prevailing defendant or a pre-
vailing plaintiff. As a prevailing plaintiff, fees were available "as a matter
of course."' 2 As a prevailing defendant, fees could have been awarded
because of plaintiff's many instances of bad faith.103
However, had the facts been different and had the plaintiff merely
lost on the counterclaim after litigating in good faith, it is not at all clear
that defendant would have been entitled to attorney's fees. Whether fees
were awarded may have turned on the pleading technicality of whether
the claim of infringement was asserted in a complaint or in a
counterclaim.
The treatment of plaintiffs and defendants differently has been sub-
jected to considerable criticism."0 In Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., Io
the Third Circuit expressed two reasons for rejecting this interpretation
of the statute. First, there is "no justification for such a departure from
98. Id. at 78.
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id. at 72. For the prior proceeding in which plaintiff's claims were dismissed, see
Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 578 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1984).
101. Nintendo, 797 F.2d at 78.
102. See supra text accompanying note 45.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. This same situation arose in Silverman v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 675 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The plaintiff's claims
were resolved in an earlier proceeding and the defendant then prevailed on its counterclaim for
copyright infringement. Fees were awarded to the prevailing counterclaimant because of
plaintiff's wilful infringement and bad faith in prolonging the action. Id. at 871. As in
Nintendo, the court in Silverman did not clarify whether, for purposes of awarding fees, the
prevailing counterclaimant was treated as a plaintiff or defendant. But given the presence of
plaintiff's bad faith, as in Nintendo, fees would have been appropriate regardless how the coun-
terclaimant was characterized.
104. This criticism of the Second Circuit's double standard would apply equally to the
Ninth Circuit's more recent adoption of a double standard. See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price,
Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1987).
105. 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
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the law's presumed equality of treatment."" Congress has given no in-
dication that it intends a different standard for plaintiffs and defend-
ants,' °7 and no such intention can be reasonably inferred.'
Second, there is no defensible reason to favor the plaintiff. One of
the stated purposes of the double standard is to encourage plaintiffs who
hold copyrights to protect their proprietary interests,"°9 but this ignores
the fact that "in many cases the defendants are [copyright] holders."" 0
Along the same lines, the Third Circuit fails "to see the virtue in encour-
aging an attempt to enlarge the scope of the copyright monopoly beyond
that conferred by the statute.""'
In Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., "2 the Eastern District of
Virginia (part of the Fourth Circuit), like the Third Circuit, expressly
rejected the Second Circuit's double standard. Again, it was held that
treating the plaintiff and the defendant differently could not be justified
on the basis of either public policy considerations' '3 or congressional in-
106. Lieb v. Topstone Indust., 788 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 1986).
107. See supra note 31 for text of legislative history. "The most reasonable interpretation is
that Congress did not intend to introduce a dichotomy that had not been employed in the
preceding sixty-odd years of the Copyright Act's existence." Lieb, 788 F.2d at 155.
108. The defendants in Lieb tried to analogize section 505 to the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Awards Act of 1976 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)), which has a legislative
history that recognizes a double standard. The court rejected this argument, saying that
"[s]ubstantially different policy considerations are present; moreover, in the reenactment of the
Copyright Act that same year, 1976, Congress did not refer to a double standard." Lieb, 788
F.2d at 155.
In rejecting this analogy between different attorney's fee statutes, the court also stated,
"'The public policies to be subserved by the sanction of awarding counsel fees may vary from
field to field. Unless cognate policies are to be enforced, the decisions in one field would not be
valid analogies to another.'" Id. n.1 (quoting Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 192 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1956)).
109. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
110. Lieb, 788 F.2d at 155.
111. Id.
112. 617 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd 88 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
113. Judge Warriner stated,
Nor am I persuaded that a distinction should be made in an award because there is
some need to encourage plaintiffs to file suit which differs in public benefit from a
need to encourage defendants to defend suits .... Who may be a plaintiff and who
may be a defendant doesn't define the difference between good guys and bad guys.
Nor can we assume that plaintiffs are inherently impecunious while defendants have
deep pockets. ... Nor can it be argued on any principled ground that society is better
off when a plaintiff files and wins a copyright infringement suit than when a defend-
ant defends and wins a copyright infringement suit. Indeed, if there is any difference




tent.'14  In fact, both public policy 1 5 and congressional intent would
seem to affirmatively reject such a standard." 6
The Cohen court went further than the Lieb court, criticizing the
Second Circuit's "free reading of its own precedent," "7 and stating that
the double standard adopted in Diamond is "the culmination of a long
line of bootstrapping from nothing to something." I 8 This bootstrapping
began with Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 9
in which attorney's fees were denied to the prevailing defendant for sev-
eral reasons. In this case, the court stated, "[T]he litigation which [the
plaintiff] instituted was not vexatious but involved a novel question of
statutory interpretation. We find no basis for questioning the good faith
of the plaintiff in instigating the litigation."' 20 The Second Circuit did
not say in Edward B. Marks that prevailing defendants and prevailing
plaintiffs were to be treated differently, or that in every instance the suit
must be vexatious or brought in bad faith before the prevailing defendant
could recover. However, in Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 2' Edward B.
Marks was cited as authority for barring an award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant except as "a penalty imposed upon the plaintiff for
institution of a baseless, frivolous, or unreasonable suit; or one instituted
in bad faith."'
122
114. "[A]bsolutely nothing in the legislative history of [s]ection 505 indicates that Congress
intended a different standard to apply where a prevailing defendant, as opposed to a prevailing
plaintiff, seeks to recover costs and attorney's fees." Id. at 621.
115. See supra note 113.
116. "[A]bsolutely nothing in the statute or in the legislative history gives to courts any
authority to distinguish between an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant and an
award to a prevailing plaintiff." 617 F. Supp. at 622; see supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 222 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1955).
120. Id. at 493.
121. 271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
122. Id. at 627. In addition to Edward B. Marks, the Breffort court relied upon three
additional cases: Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1956);
Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
In Davis, the court reviewed prior case law from the Second Circuit and found that a
defendant is generally denied fees unless there is evidence of bad faith or frivolity on the part of
plaintiff. The court was reluctant, however, to hold that bad faith or frivolity was a prerequi-
site to awarding fees to the defendant. "If the courts have indeed applied a more restrictive
rule when defendants prevail than when plaintiffs succeed, a possible explanation may be that
an award to a defendant is somewhat more 'at variance with the usual practice in litigation
before our courts .... Davis, 257 F. Supp. at 732 (emphasis added). As late as 1966, the
date of the Davis decision, the court expressly chose to disregard whether plaintiff or defendant
prevailed, but rather decide the issue of fees on "other general principles found in the relevant
decisions." Id.
In Barton Candy, the court stated that attorney's fees "have generally been denied unless
plaintiff's claim was capricious or unreasonable.., or unless the situation calls for 'penaliza-
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 13:411
ArrORNEY's FEES UNDER THE COPYRIGHT AcT
Likewise, Mailer v. R.K0. Teleradio Pictures, Inc. 123 was cited to
support a proposition it did not state. In Mailer, the Second Circuit up-
held the district court's discretionary award to the prevailing defendant
of only minimal attorney's fees, because the plaintiff's claim was neither
"synthetic" nor "capricious." '124  This holding was later cited for the
proposition that a prevailing defendant can recover only when "the
plaintiff's claims are objectively without arguable merit."' 25
Like the double standard in general, predicating an award of fees to
prevailing defendants on a finding of bad faith has been the subject of
much criticism. A prerequisite of bad faith has been considered and re-
jected by courts in other circuits. 26 One court in the Second Circuit has
even stated that it is very difficult to apply a "bad faith" standard because
the terms "are themselves so inherently subjective and difficult to
define."' 27
There is no indication that Congress intended bad faith to be a pre-
requisite to an award; neither the statute'28 nor the legislative history' 29
tion of the losing party.' "Barton, 178 F. Supp. at 584 (quoting Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp.
63, 69 (D.C.N.Y. 1954), and Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cal.
1942)).
Similarly, the Cloth court held that fees are "properly awarded when the infringement
action has been commenced in bad faith." The court then relied upon Edward B. Marks for
the proposition that "[wihere the claim of infringement is not synthetic, capricious or other-
wise unreasonable, such fees have not been allowed." Cloth, 146 F. Supp. at 193.
None of these three cases relied upon by the Breffort court clearly state that a prevailing
defendant would be awarded fees only if the plaintiff had exhibited bad faith. The Cloth court
came the closest to laying down such a ruling, but like the Breffort court, the Cloth court relied
upon Edward B. Marks.
123. 332 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1964).
124. Id. at 749.
125. Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Co., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984); see Cohen,
617 F. Supp. at 622 (criticism of the basis for the holding in Diamond).
126. See, e.g., R.C.A./Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayson Co., 845 F.2d 773, 780 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("It appears that bad faith has not been considered a prerequisite for awarding
attorneys' fees in this circuit."); Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King, Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1035
(1 th Cir. 1987) ("[It is not a precondition to an award to show that the losing party acted in
bad faith or brought a frivolous claim."); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.
1986) ("We think that limiting assessments to those cases where bad faith is shown unduly
narrows the discretion granted to the district judges.... [W]e decline to so limit the condi-
tions under which an assessment may be made.").
127. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 534 F. Supp. 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 9 for the language of 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988). The
fact that the statute is silent as to any requirement of bad faith was recognized in M.C.A., Inc.
v. Parks, 796 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) and International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855
F.2d 375, 384 (7th Cir. 1988).
129. See supra note 31 for text of legislative history. We find "no indication either in statu-
tory language or legislative history that bad faith should be a prerequisite to a fee award."
Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 1986).
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mention bad faith. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EE.O.C., 30 the
United States Supreme Court stated, "it has long been established that
even under the American common-law rule attorney's fees may be
awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith."'' a3 Similarly,
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 132 the Supreme
Court said that a court may assess attorney's fees without statutory au-
thority "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or for oppressive reasons.' ,,'aa This judicially created exception to
the general rule is "unquestionably [an] assertion[ ] of inherent power in
the courts to allow attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbid-
den by Congress."' 134 "Congress has not repudiated the judicially fash-
ioned exceptions to the general rule against allowing .. .attorneys'
fees." 1
35
If courts, under their inherent powers and without statutory author-
ity, are free to award attorney's fees when the losing party has acted in
bad faith, 17 U.S.C. § 505 adds nothing to what the courts were already
free to do, but becomes a mere redundancy. 36 The statute, however,
must be read not to be meaningless. Congress must have enacted the
statute with some purpose in mind. The only logical conclusion is that
the statute was enacted to grant the courts power to award fees when
they would not have otherwise been able to do so. Therefore, it should
be clear that the statute authorizes courts to exercise their discretion in
awarding attorney's fees even without finding bad faith on the part of a
losing party.
Of the standards that have been adopted by the circuit courts, a
double standard that treats the parties differently and that conditions an
award to the defendant on plaintiff's bad faith is the least defensible. The
double standard has the least secure foundation of all the adopted stan-
dards. No direct or indirect support can be found in the statute or in its
130. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
131. Id. at 419.
132. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
133. Id. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Luber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1974)).
134. Id. at 259.
135. Id. at 260.
136. "Had Congress intended to condition the award of fees on the presence of bad faith,
the statutory provision would have been surplusage." Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151,
155 (3d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit has
articulated a "frivolous" or "bad faith" standard in order to award attorneys' fees to
prevailing defendants under [section] 505. One can see that these courts have in
effect propounded the general equitable standard of "bad faith" that is used to award
attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory provision for such fees.
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Corp. 534 F. Supp. 606, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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legislative history. 37 The double standard is the result of a court ex-
panding the narrow, fact-dependent holdings of past cases into broad
generalized principles. These principles are then to be applied to all fu-
ture cases whether or not they correspond to the fact patterns of the
original cases from which these principles were derived.
B. The "Express Interpretation Standard" of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits
Because of the historical connection between the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, 3 ' the two circuits have interpreted section 505 similarly.
1. The Fifth Circuit
In Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 39 the Fifth Circuit stated,
"Although attorney's fees are awarded in the trial court's discretion, they
are the rule rather than the exception and should be awarded rou-
tinely."'"' This interpretation of section 505 is based on an earlier
noncopyright decision of the Fifth Circuit in which the court held,
"Where a statute or contractual provision authorizes a fee award, such
an award becomes the rule rather than the exception, and should be
awarded routinely as are costs of suit." 41
Although fees are "routinely" granted, they are not mandated; the
court retains sufficient discretion to deny fees under certain circum-
stances. In Streeter v. Rolfe, 14 2 the Federal District Court for the West-
ern District of Louisiana denied fees to a prevailing defendant because
the plaintiff had instigated the action in good faith.' a Because of plain-
tiff's good faith, "an award of attorney's fees would [have been]
improper."144
137. "Since Congress has made no indication to the contrary, explicitly or implicitly, I am
bound by the plain language of the statute. The statute surely says nothing more or less than
that a judge is to use an even-handed approach in awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing
party." Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd,
788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1987)
138. The Eleventh Circuit was created in 1981 and is made up of states that used to be part
of the Fifth Circuit.
139. 779 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1985).
140. Id. at 259.
141. Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 732 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 553, 558 (E.D. La. 1987) ("In this Circuit, attor-
neys' fees in a copyright infringement action are the rule rather than the exception and 'should
be awarded routinely.'" (quoting Micromanipulator, 799 F.2d at 1241)).
142. 491 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. La. 1980).
143. "[I]t is the opinion of this court that plaintiff's suit was brought in good faith. ...




2 The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has had greater opportunity to address this
issue and has, therefore, more fully explained its standard. As a starting
point, the court has held that "the only preconditions to an award of fees
is [sic] that the party receiving the fee be the 'prevailing party' and that
the fee be reasonable."1 45 However, even if these statutory conditions are
satisfied, fees are not mandated.'46 Unlike other circuits, 147 the Eleventh
Circuit does not condition an award of fees on willful infringement, frivo-
lous claims, or the bad faith of the losing party.141
The presence of willful infringement does not compel an award of
fees but is "an 'important factor' in the district court's 'discretionary
decisionmaking'" and may serve as the basis for an award of fees.
149
Likewise, the complexity of the issues raised in the case, the good faith of
the losing party, and the fact that the losing party's legal position had
arguable merit would justify a denial of fees to the prevailing party but
would not mandate a denial of fees.'5 0
On most occasions, the Eleventh Circuit has treated plaintiffs and
defendants equally. The only difference is that a denial of fees to a pre-
vailing defendant is "all the more appropriate ...where the plaintiff
asserted colorable copyright claims of the type which 'section 505 is in-
tended in part to encourage.' "II In Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel
King of Florida, Inc., 152 the losing plaintiff, who was assessed attorney's
fees, argued that the Eleventh Circuit should abandon its position and
adopt the double standard of the Second Circuit. Although the Eleventh
Circuit declined to do so, stating that it was bound by its own precedent,
145. Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832 (11th Cir.
1982).
146. Donald Frederick Evans'& Assocs. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 916
(1 th Cir. 1986) ("The [statutory] language clearly indicates that awarding of fees to the pre-
vailing party is not mandatory.").
147. See section (II)(A) supra for a discussion of the standards in force in the Second and
Ninth Circuits where an award of fees to a prevailing defendant is predicated on certain
findings.
148. Evans, 785 F.2d at 916; Toy Loft, 684 F.2d at 832.
149. Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829, 854 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
150. Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King, Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1034 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co., 825 F.2d 355, 356 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Evans,
785 F.2d at 916; Toy Loft, 684 F.2d at 832.
151. Evans, 785 F.2d at 916-17 (quoting Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d
142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984)). The court does not explain what types of copyright claims section
505 is intended in part to encourage. Although relying on a Second Circuit case, the court does
not adopt the Second Circuit's formulation of the purpose of Section 505 ("to encourage the
assertion of colorable copyright claims" (Diamond, 745 F.2d at 148) (emphasis added)), nor
does it state what it finds the purpose of the statute to be.
152. 822 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1987).
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the court did not offer any defense of its own standard or'criticism of the
Second Circuit's interpretation of section 505.'s'
3. Analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' Standard
In an attempt to properly interpret the statute, one must begin by
looking at the language to see what is said and what is not said. . In stat-
ing that the award of fees is discretionary, Congress differentiated this
statute from other fee-award statutes that mandate awarding fees or in
some way indicate that fees are to be sparingly awarded." 4 Since Con-
gress chose not to make the award of attorney's fees mandatory, one may
safely assume that it did not intend fees to be routinely granted in every
case. 1 5" Conversely, since Congress placed no restrictions on the award-
ing of fees (other than limiting the fee to a reasonable amount and al-
lowing only the prevailing party to recover), it may also be assumed that
fees are to be freely granted and not restricted to "exceptional" '156 cases.
Overall, the Eleventh Circuit has given the district courts broad dis-
cretion, but very little guidance, in determining when fees are appropri-
ate. The court of appeals has held that an award of fees is not
mandatory, but may be freely granted. Also, while there are no prerequi-
sites to an award, the district courts in the Eleventh Circuit may freely
deny an award of fees. The court of appeals has not yet stated what
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Case law shows that as long as the
fees are awarded to the prevailing party and the amount is reasonable,
discretion has not been abused.
The Fifth Circuit's statement that fees "are the rule rather than the
exception and should be awarded routinely"' 57 is more problematic. It
implies that there would be very limited circumstances, if any, when the
court could deny fees to a prevailing party without abusing its discretion.
If this is so, the district court does not really have a decision to make,
because there will always be a prevailing party, and the reasonableness of
the amount can be determined at a later date. The "prevailing party"
and "reasonableness of amount" portions of the statute are merely limi-
tations on the court's discretion. When these factors are satisfied, attor-
ney's fees are not statutorily required and need not be automatically
153. Id. at 1034 n.3.
154. See Berger, supra note 3, at 303-04.
155. "(W]e do not believe Congress intended that the prevailing party should be awarded
attorney's fees in every case as a matter of course. Were that the contemplated result, the
statute would not have left the matter to the courts' discretion but would simply have man-
dated a fee allowance." Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1986).
156. Under the Patent and Lanham Acts, the court may award fees only in "exceptional"
cases. See discussion supra note 29.
157. Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1985).
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granted. It is only at this point that the court can balance the equities of
the case and freely exercise its discretion to award fees or, just as impor-
tantly, not to award fees. A court should not willingly or readily abdi-
cate this congressional grant of discretionary power.
C. The "Balancing Standard" of the Third Circuit
Until Lieb v. Topstone Industries' was decided in 1986, the Third
Circuit had not faced the issue of determining when attorney's fees
should be awarded under section 505.19 The court discussed the stan-
dards in force in other circuits and, after finding them wanting, devised
its own standard. The court expressly rejected the ideas of subjecting
plaintiffs and defendants to different standards, I° predicating an award
of fees on a finding of bad faith,1 61 or routinely granting fees to the pre-
vailing party. 1
62
Instead, the Third Circuit adopted a rather amorphous list of factors
to be considered by the trial court in determining whether to award fees.
These factors include "frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonable-
ness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case), and the
need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensa-
tion and deterrence." 163 The factors to be considered are not limited to
158. 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
159. In referring to what standard should govern the discretionary award of attorney's fees
under the Copyright Act, the court stated, "Precedents in this court are notable for their
absence." Id. at 155.
Similarly in Chappell & Co. v. Middletown Farmers Mkt. & Auction Co., 334 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1964), the court upheld an award of attorney's fees with very little discussion. The
court stated, "The allowance of attorney's fees in copyright infringement cases has tradition-
ally been a matter peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge .... [We are not con-
vinced] that the total award of $1000 in attorney's fees was unreasonable or an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge." Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
160. "Nor do we accept the double standard for plaintiffs and defendants.... [We find no
justification for such a departure from the law's presumed equality of treatment." Lieb, 788
F.2d at 155.
161. The court stated,
We think that limiting assessments to those cases where bad faith is shown unduly
narrows the discretion granted to the district judges. Finding no indication either in
statutory language or legislative history that bad faith should be a prerequisite to a
fee award, we decline to so limit the conditions under which an assessment may be
made.
Id. See supra notes 95-137 and accompanying text for a criticism of predicating fees on a
finding of bad faith.
162. "[W]e do not believe Congress intended that the prevailing party should be awarded
attorney's fees in every case as a matter of course. Were that the contemplated result, the
statute would not have left the matter to the courts' discretion but would simply have man-
dated a fee allowance." Leib, 788 F.2d at 155-56.
163. Id. at 156.
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those listed; specific situations may call for unique considerations.'
64
The end result is that, in balancing the interests and actions of the two
parties, the judge is allowed broad discretion in determining whether to
award fees.I65 This standard allows the trial judge more discretion than
the more detailed and restrictive standards adopted by the other circuits.
Although the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania decided Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. 66 prior to the Third Circuit's decision in Lieb, the decisions are
compatible. The prevailing plaintiff in Whelan was denied attorney's fees
despite the fact the defendant had willfully infringed. 167 The following
reasons were given for denying the requested fees: 1) the case involved
novel and complex issues (copyright protection of computer programs);
2) the defenses presented by the defendant were neither frivolous nor
dilatory; 3) the defendant acted in good faith in following the advice of
competent legal counsel and believed it was in the right; and 4) recovery
of fees was barred by section 412.168
In interpreting this statute, the Third Circuit declined to read into
the statute any congressional intent or requirement that is not clearly
expressed. Instead of restricting the trial court's discretion with artifi-
cially imposed requirements, its standard is based on a plain reading of
the statute-both what it says and what it does not say. Consequently,
this standard is the most defensible.
164. Id.
165. "Moreover, we may not usurp that broad area [of discretion] which Congress has
reserved for the district judge." Id.
166. 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987) [hereinafter Whelan II].
167. Id. at 1332. In an earlier ruling, the district court had held that the prevailing plaintiff
was entitled to fees because the defendant had willfully and intentionally infringed plaintiffs'
copyright. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)
[hereinafter Whelan I]. This decision was reconsidered and a contrary ruling was rendered in
Whelan II.
168. Whelan II, 609 F. Supp. at 1329-31. The court noted that even if fees were not pre-
cluded by section 412, it would still decline to award fees for the other reasons stated. Id. at
1332. See infra note 332 for the text of section 412 and infra section IV(C) for an explanation





The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not addressed the
issue,169 but the Federal District Court for the District of Maine has ex-
pressly adopted the Second Circuit's double standard. 17o In Motta v. Sa-
muel Weiser, Inc., 171 the prevailing defendant was denied fees because 1)
the plaintiff's suit was not baseless, frivolous, unreasonable, or brought
in bad faith, and 2) courts have generally been more hesitant to award
fees to a victorious defendant than to a victorious plaintiff. 72
More recently, the District of Maine held in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Larkin 173 that "[a]ttorney's fees are routinely granted in copyright in-
fringement cases."' 174  Notwithstanding this statement, the result falls
squarely in line with the Second Circuit's standard; the losing defendants
were found to have knowingly infringed and were unable to offer any
justification for their actions.
17
Without going so far as to make willfulness a prerequisite, other
district courts in the First Circuit have awarded fees where the losing
defendant was sufficiently "blameworthy,"' 176 or had deliberately, know-
ingly, and unjustifiably infringed the plaintiff's copyright. 177 In several
cases in the District of New Hampshire, the court has awarded fees to
the prevailing plaintiff without stating any specific reason, other than it is
a matter for the court's discretion. 78 However, in other portions of the
169. In Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1984), the court chose not to decide the
propriety of a lower court's award of attorney's fees, because the issue was not properly pre-
served for appeal. In doing so, the court let stand an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
defendant. The court did comment, however, that the award of $1,400 was "modest" and that
"extremely able work" had been done. Id. at 224.
170. Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 32, 33 (D. Me. 1986).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 33-34. The court based its deaision on the Second Circuit's double standard and
relied principally on Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984),
and Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf& Western Corp., 534 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
173. 672 F. Supp. 531 (D. Me. 1987).
174. Id. at 535 (citing Warner Bros. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478, 484 (N.D. Ohio
1984)). For a discussion of the origin and validity of this statement, see infra notes 204-12 and
accompanying text.
175. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. at 536.
176. Rare Blue Music, Inc. v. Guttadauro, 616 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (D. Mass. 1985).
177. Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (D.R.I. 1982).
178. Hulex Music v. Santy, 698 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.H. 1988); Merrill v. County
Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164, 1172 (D.N.H. 1987); Sailor Music v. Mai Kai of Concord,
Inc., 640 F. Supp. 629, 636 (D.N.H. 1986).
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Like the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has not yet addressed the
issue of "whether a prevailing defendant is to be treated less favorably
than a prevailing plaintiff in awarding counsel fees and costs under [sec-
tion] 505."' s However, in two recent cases in the Eastern District of
Virginia,"'1 both decided by the same judge, 1 2 attorney's fees were
awarded. In Music City v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., Is3 the plaintiff was granted
judgment by default and was summarily awarded fees on the basis of a
factually similar case from another jurisdiction. 8 4 In the more recent
case, Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., l 5 the court included a care-
fully reasoned review of the current standards in force in the various
circuits and vigorously rejected the idea of treating plaintiffs and defend-
ants differently or predicating a fee award on bad faith.'86 The court
chose to follow the plain language of the statute without reading in any
unspoken requirement and to "use an even-handed approach in awarding
attorney's fees to a prevailing party."'8 7 The standard adopted by the
court is very similar to that adopted by the Third Circuit.1
8 8
179. Hulex, 698 F. Supp. at 1032 ("the [clourt finds defendant's protestations of good faith
disingenuous"); Merrill, 669 F. Supp. at 1172 ("Defendant['s] ... disavowal of all knowledge
of copyright laws .... taken in the light of the numerous contacts by ASCAP and the substan-
tial size and nature of [defendant's] total [business] operation, is disingenuous at best."); Sailor
Music, 640 F. Supp. at 635 ("Defendants' blameworthiness here is significant.").
180. Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 620 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd,
788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986). In Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co.,
810 F.2d 410, 414 (4th Cir. 1987), an award of fees based on the defendant's willful infringe-
ment was summarily affirmed. There was no discussion of the standard of review or the appro-
priate standard for awarding fees under section 505.
181. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at 619; Music City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 F. Supp. 1001
(E.D. Va. 1985).
182. The Honorable J.D. Dortch Warriner.
183. 616 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Va. 1985).
184. Id at 1004. Although no affirmative reason for its award of fees was given, the court
granted statutory damages for the following reasons: 1) willfulness of infringement; 2) non-
responsiveness of the defendant; 3) the need to deter the defendant from choosing to violate the
copyright laws in the future; and, 4) the strong public interest in insuring the integrity of the
copyright laws. Id. at 1003-04.
185. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. 619.
186. Id. at 621-23; see also supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
188. In adopting its "evenhanded" approach to section 505, the Third Circuit cited and
relied upon Cohen, 617 F. Supp. 619. See Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.
1986).
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C. Sixth Circuit
In M. CA., Inc. v. Parks,'89 the Sixth Circuit acknowledged and
briefly summarized the standards in force in the Ninth, Eleventh, and
Third Circuits, specifically noting the split on whether bad faith is a pre-
requisite to a fee award.' 90 The court was prepared to address the issue
and to adopt a comprehensive standard, but declined to do so when the
appealing defendant conceded during oral arguments that if it were liable
for infringement it must also be liable for attorney's fees. 9 '
In Coleman v. Payne, 192 Blumcraft v. Nowman Bros. 193 United Fea-
tures Syndicate v. Spree,'94 and Warner Bros. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 95 the
district courts awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs, but
based their decisions on different rationales. The court in Coleman found
the defendant to have "knowingly and intentionally violated"' 96 plain-
tiff's copyright and awarded fees because "[a]ttorney's fees are routinely
granted in similar copyright infringement actions."' 97 Although the de-
cision turned on defendant's willfulness, the court did not go so far as to
say that willfulness is a prerequisite.
In Blumcraft, the prevailing plaintiff was awarded fees because the
purported objective of awarding fees is "not to punish an infringing de-
fendant, but to 'impose a liability... and vindicate the statutory policy
.. . even for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright.' "198
The court held that the "defendant's copying was not deliberate"' 99 and
189. 796 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986).
190. Id. at 204-05.
191. The court stated,
In light of these concessions from the [defendant's] counsel, we need not, and
expressly do not, reach the question of the proper standard to be applied by a trial
court in awarding attorney's fees under section 505 of the Copyright Act. While this
case might otherwise have presented an appropriate vehicle for an answer to this
question, our adversary system of justice forbids us to resolve issues not contested by
the parties. Since the [defendants] concede the propriety of this award of attorney's
fees if the trial court correctly found a violation[,] and since we have already deter-
mined that the trial court was correct in this regard, we hold that the award of
attorney's fees was proper under the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 205.
192. 698 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
193. 337 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
194. 600 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
195. 582 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
196. Coleman, 698 F. Supp. at 706.
197. Id. at 709.
198. 337 F. Supp. at 865 (quoting F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S.
228, 233 (1952)).
199. Id. at 864-65. The court did, however, recount that the defendant was a patent in-
fringer and had in the past made a practice of consistently coming very close to copyright
infringement. The court finally concluded that the copying in the present case was not
deliberate.
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expressly rejected the notion that before fees could be awarded there
must be "some element of moral blame against the losing party.
' '2
00
The court in Spree was not altogether clear in explaining its reason
for granting fees to the prevailing plaintiff. It stated that plaintiff's coun-
sel "expended numerous hours in pretrial preparation before and after
the filing of this lawsuit. The Russell court stated that 'the amount of
work necessitated and performed and the skill employed' are to be con-
sidered in order to grant attorney fees."
20 1
The statement quoted from Russell refers to a determination of the
reasonableness of the amount, not whether a discretionary award should
be granted. 2 It is unclear whether the court in Spree relied on this
quote as an indication of when fees should be awarded or as guidance in
determining the reasonableness of the amount of the award. If it is the
first, as it would appear, the statement was taken out of context to sup-
port a proposition not contemplated in Russell. If it is the second, the
court gave no reason why it was exercising its discretion to award fees
other than the fact that the party to receive the fees "prevailed" and it is
within the court's discretion to award such fees.20 3
In Lobster Pot, the court stated that "[a]ttorney's fees are routinely
granted in copyright infringement actions." 2' Although this standard is
recognized in the Fifth Circuit,20 5 the Lobster Pot court relied on case
law from district courts in Ohio, New York, and Iowa.2'6 The Ohio case
that was relied upon is unpublished.20 7 The other two cases are pub-
lished and neither includes any statement that attorneys' fees are rou-
tinely granted. In the New York case,20 8 the Second Circuit's double
standard applied and the district court granted fees to the prevailing
plaintiff, stating that "[b]ecause of the early denials of infringement that
defendant later conceded, [plaintiff] incurred greatly increased litigation
costs in vindicating its copyright.' ' 2 9 In the Iowa case relied upon by the
200. Id. at 865.
201. Spree, 600 F. Supp. at 1248 (quoting Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1132 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980)).
202. "While the $10,000 awarded plaintiffs in fees might be considered generous when
compared with the amount recovered in damages, the fees do not appear unreasonable consid-
ering the amount of work necessitated and performed and skill employed." Russell, 612 F.2d
at 1132.
203. Spree, 600 F. Supp. at 1248.
204. Warner Bros. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478, 484 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
205. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
206. Lobster Pot, 582 F. Supp. at 484.
207. See Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., Nos. C79-243Y and C80-1899Y (N.D. Ohio Oct. 30,
1981).
208. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Brdcst. Cos., 475 F. Supp.
78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
209. Id. at 83.
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Lobster Pot court, fees were granted to the prevailing plaintiff without
discussion or explanation.21°
Unfortunately, the statement in Lobster Pot that fees are routinely
awarded has in turn been relied upon by at least one other court in decid-
ing whether to award fees.21' Like the Second Circuit's double standard,
this is another example of bootstrapping from nothing to something. 2 2
In both S.A.S. Institute v. S & H Computer Systems 213 and Leeds
Music Ltd. v. Robin,21 4 the plaintiffs prevailed but were denied attorney's
fees. In S.A.S. Institute, attorney's fees were precluded by 17 U.S.C.
§ 412,21 but the court indicated that attorney's fees are especially appro-
priate when there has been willful infringement, as there was in this
case.
216
In Leeds Music, the plaintiff sought a permanent injunction re-
straining the defendant from infringing plaintiff's copyright.2 17 The de-
fendant argued that the plaintiff's copyright was not valid,218 but the
court upheld the validity of the copyright and issued the requested in-
junctions.219 In response to the prevailing plaintiff's request for fees, the
court stated, "In view of the special circumstances here presented...
the statutory policy expressed in 17 U.S.C. § 505 will be vindicated by
... exercising our discretion to deny the award of an attorney's fee.
' 220
It is not clear what "special circumstances" the court-was referring to,
what statutory policy is expressed in 17 U.S.C. § 505, or how denying
fees would vindicate that policy. However, it is clear from the opinion
that the court upheld the validity of the plaintiff's copyright, 22' and that
the defendant was ready and willing to continue knowingly infringing
plaintiff's copyright.
222
Because the Sixth Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to deline-
ate a standard to be applied in such cases, the lower courts have been left
without guidance and have applied different standards. While the results
210. See Warner Bros. v. O'Keefe, 468 F. Supp. 16, 20 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
211. B.M.I. v. Larkin, 672 F. Supp. 531 (D. Me. 1987).
212. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
213. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
214. 358 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
215. See infra section IV(C) for a discussion of the preclusive effect of section 412.
216. SA.S. Inst., 605 F. Supp. at 831.
217. Leeds, 358 F. Supp. at 651.
218. Id. at 653.
219. Id. at 652, 660.
220. Id. at 660; see supra note 9 (§ 116 was recodified at § 505 in 1976).
221. Leeds, 358 F. Supp. at 659.
222. "We have no doubt that if the earlier [preliminary injunction was] lifted, the defend-
ants would proceed to attempt to carry out their plans of [infringing plaintiff's copyright]."
Id. at 653.
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are not necessarily conflicting, the bases for those results are often at
odds with each other.
D. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has so far declined to adopt a comprehensive
standard regarding the exercise of discretion under section 505. In Inter-
national Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 2 3 the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged the division among the circuits on whether an award of fees must
be predicated on a finding of bad faith or willfulness. 24 The court found
it unnecessary to resolve the question, because the losing defendant was
found to be a willful infringer22 and because this finding was sufficient to
support an award of fees. 26 The court reaffirmed its earlier position that
fees may be awarded for willful infringement 227 but did not state that
willfulness is a prerequisite to recovery of fees.2 The cases in the Sev-
enth Circuit can best be divided between those in which the plaintiff pre-
vailed and those in which the defendant prevailed. In the former,
plaintiff was generally awarded fees; in the latter, the defendant was gen-
erally denied fees.
The most common reason given for awarding fees to a prevailing
plaintiff was the fact that the defendant had willfully or flagrantly in-
fringed the plaintiff's copyright rights.2 29 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
223. 855 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
224. Id. at 384 n.18 (The court specifically cites to cases from the Ninth, Second, and Fifth
Circuits.).
225. Fees were granted by the trial court, because defendant was a willful infringer and
because "defendant's handling of the summary judgment proceedings unnecessarily had re-
quired trial." Id. at 384.
226. Id. (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1983)).
227. International Korwin, 855 F.2d at 384; see also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co.,
905 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990) (court held that the losing defendant's bad faith is a
"factor" for the court to consider and is sufficient to support an award of fees).
228. See also Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (district court
denied fees to the prevailing plaintiff because the defendant's infringement was not "wilful").
The Seventh Circuit again acknowledged the division among the circuits as to whether bad
faith is a precondition to an award of fees, but chose not to resolve the issue. The denial of a
fee award was affirmed because the "substantial" award of profits to the plaintiff made com-
pensation through fees unnecessary and the defendant was sufficiently deterred. Id. at 942-43.
229. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir.
1990) (defendant had actual knowledge that its actions constituted infringement and made no
effort to resolve the matter with plaintiff); Taylor. 712 F.2d at 1122 ("there was abundant
evidence that the infringement was willful, so the magistrate acted well within her discretion in
awarding [attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff]"); B.M.I. v. Niro's Palace, Inc., 619 F.
Supp. 958, 964 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (the defendant refused to enter into a licensing agreement or to
stop infringing, and repeatedly rebuffed offers to resolve the dispute prior to trial); George
Simon, Inc. v. Spatz, 492 F. Supp. 836, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (the defendant, owner of a
restaurant, refused to obtain a license for live performances of copyrighted music).
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Fox Amusement Co., 2 30 the court awarded the prevailing plaintiff statu-
tory monetary damages and attorney's fees because the "[d]enial of such
fees here would have the practical effect of reducing BMI's net recovery
below the amount this court views as reasonable statutory damages."2 3 '1
The court concluded that "[n]o special factors justify . . . a denial of
attorneys' fees." '232
In Balcaen v. Herschberger, 2 33 the plaintiff received attorney's fees
after the parties had agreed to a settlement.234 The court awarded fees to
the plaintiff, the "prevailing party, '2 35 holding that it was within its dis-
cretionary power to award fees to the "prevailing party. ' 236 No other
reason for the award was given.237 The rationale of the court, in this
instance, is reminiscent of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' approach,23 s
in that no reason is given for awarding fees other than the fact that the
party awarded fees prevailed.239
Federal courts in the Seventh Circuit have given the following rea-
sons for denying fees to a prevailing defendant: 1) the plaintiff's claims
were not entirely without merit; 2 ° 2) the plaintiff should not be assessed
fees for trying to protect his copyright; 24' 3) the plaintiff prosecuted the
230. 551 F. Supp. 104 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
231. Id. at 109.
232. Id.
233. 415 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
234. "The decree and order was entered as the result of settlement discussions had between
the parties which terminated in an apparent agreement. The [c]ourt's order provided ... that
defendant pay plaintiff's taxable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees." Id. at 334.
235. "[T]he plain meaning of the term 'prevailing party'... is not limited to include only a
party who prevails after trial on the merits. Rather, the operative criteria is success at the
conclusion of all proceedings, not by what means that success is obtained." Id. at 335 (cita-
tions omitted).
236. "[I]f the plaintiff can be said to be the 'prevailing party,' then he is entitled to recover
his costs and may, in the [clourt's discretion, also be entitled to an award of fees." Id. at 334.
237. The plaintiff did assert that the defendant "delayed payment of the sum specified in
the settlement agreement (exclusive of costs and fees) in bad faith." Id. at 334. The court,
however, did not state that this alleged bad faith was taken into account in determining
whether or not to grant or affirm the award of attorney's fees.
238. See supra section II(B) for a discussion of the standard adopted by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.
239. "Defendant and its counsel urge that defendant's conduct was in good faith, always
conducted under the guidance and advice of counsel. Accepting those protestations as true,
plaintiff should not suffer because of defendant's counsel's erroneous advice." Baldwin Cooke
Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 409 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Contra Whelan II, supra note
166 (fees were not awarded to the prevailing party when the losing party had relied on the
guidance and advice of counsel).
240. Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957).
241. Id.
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Like the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit has ac-
knowledged the differing standards among the circuits, but has so far
declined to adopt or develop its own standard. In three recent cases,
however, this circuit has provided some guidance.
First, in Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 2  the prevailing defend-
ant, who had been denied attorney's fees, urged the adoption of the
"evenhanded approach" 245 of the Third Circuit, as expressed in Lieb v.
Topstone Industries.246 The court summarized the views of the Second,
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,247 but declined to adopt any of
these standards, stating that "[u]nder any of the standards that have been
applied to the section 505 fee determination, the finding that [the losing
plaintiff's] claim was not baseless supports the district court's determina-
tion not to award fees."248 The Hartman court, however, did not ex-
pressly state whether a finding that the losing plaintiff's claims are
baseless is a prerequisite to an award of fees, as the Ninth and Second
Circuits require, or whether the lack of bad faith is merely one factor to
consider, which in itself is sufficient to justify a denial of fees in the Elev-
enth and Third Circuits.
Second, in R.C.A./Ariola International, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston
Co., 
2 4 9 the court resolved the above issue by reaffirming a much earlier
opinion that bad faith is not a prerequisite for awarding attorney's
fees.250 Third, in Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the University of
Minnesota,251 the trial court did not award fees to the prevailing plaintiff,
because it found "numerous complex or novel questions which defendant
had litigated vigorously and in good faith. '2 5 2 Plaintiff appealed the de-
nial of fees. The appellate court summarized the standards in force in the
Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits and then stated, "We are reluctant to
adopt a particular standard. For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to
242. Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 421 F. Supp. 372, 378 (N.D. I1. 1976).
243. Id.
244. 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987).
245. Id. at 122; see supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
246. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
247. Hartman, 833 F.2d at 122-23.
248. Id. at 123.
249. 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988).
250. Id. at 780. The court relied upon its previous decision in Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d
777, 783 (8th Cir. 1962), that bad faith is not a prerequisite to an award of fees.
251. 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989).
252. Id. at 638.
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decide that attorney's fees should not be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff
as a matter of course."
25 3
The court's rejection of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' practice of
routinely granting fees254 was expressly limited in its application to pre-
vailing plaintiffs.255 Presumably, this refusal to grant fees routinely
would be extended to include prevailing defendants, since no circuit has
favored prevailing defendants over prevailing plaintiffs. At best, they are
treated equally.
With the rejection of the bad faith requirement, the Eighth Circuit
implicitly rejected not only the Ninth Circuit's double standard25 6 in its
entirety, but also the double standard of the Second Circuit, as it applies
to prevailing defendants. 257 Under the Ninth Circuit's standard, bad
faith on the part of the losing party is a prerequisite for an award of
fees.258 Similarly, under the Second Circuit's standard, fees are awarded
to the prevailing defendant only if the losing plaintiff acted in bad
faith.259
Of the established standards, the only one not implicitly rejected in
whole or part is that of the Third Circuit.2 ° When expressly requested
to adopt the Third Circuit's standard, the court declined to do so, stating
that it was unnecessary under the circumstances of the case.261 How-
ever, the court's decisions in the above three cases are all consistent with,
or based upon, the Third Circuit's standard.262
F. Tenth Circuit
Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the district courts within that circuit
have expressed a standard concerning fee awards under the Copyright
253. Id.
254. See supra section II(B) for a discussion of the standard in force in the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits.
255. Applied Innovations, 876 F.2d at 638 ("Attorney's fees should not be awarded to a
prevailing plaintiff as a matter of course.").
256. See supra section II(A)(2) for a discussion of the standard in force in the Ninth
Circuit.
257. See supra section II(A)(1) for a discussion of the standard in force in the Second
Circuit.
258. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir.
1985).
259. Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1986).
260. See supra section II(C) for a discussion of the standard in force in the Third Circuit.
261. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1987).
262. The court's decisions in Hartman, that fees not be awarded when the losing plaintiff's
claims are not frivolous, baseless, or brought in bad faith, and in R. C.A. /lAriola, that bad faith
is not a prerequisite to an award of fees, are consistent with the Third Circuit's standard. In
Applied Innovations, when the court determined that fees should not be awarded to the prevail-
ing plaintiff as a matter of course, it specifically relied upon the Third Circuit's decision in Lieb
v. Topstone Indus., 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987).
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Act.2 63 In fact, none of the reported decisions state the reason for grant-
ing or denying fees.26 In several cases in which fees were granted, the
court states or implies that the party against whom the fees were
awarded had acted in bad faith or had willfully infringed.2 65 Whether
the fact of bad faith or willfulness served as a basis for the Award is
unclear.
G. District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit has not yet adopted a comprehen-
sive standard for applying the provisions of section 505. The court has
acknowledged the divergent standards adopted by the various circuits,
266
but has not yet been faced with a situation in which it has been necessary
to adopt or formulate a standard of its own. In discussing the various
standards, the court recently stated, "We need not decide which standard
for an award of attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act is the correct
one.'"267 The court, however, has provided some guidance in this area.
Reader's Digest Association v. Conservative Digest268 presented an
unusual situation in that both the plaintiff and the defendant prevailed in
part and both sought fees. Since the case involved allegations of trade
dress and copyright infringement, the court outlined, in part, the applica-
263. The Tenth Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to address this issue. In its one
reported decision regarding attorney's fees under the Copyright Act, the court reversed an
award of fees because the claim did not arise under the Copyright Act. Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 528 (10th Cir. 1987).
264. In Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1988), the defendant was
granted summary judgment and requested attorney's fees. The plaintiff then moved for sanc-
tions and fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which the defendant considered to be
a sanctionable motion. The court considered the propriety of awarding fees under Rule I I and
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1948), and then denied all fee requests. The defendant's original fee request
was presumably made pursuant to the Copyright Act. However, this fact is not made clear,
and, even so, the court gave no reason for its denial.
In Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987),
fees were awarded to the prevailing party with the statement that "[t]he court finds this an
appropriate case for the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff." No other reason was given.
265. See Rick Hall Music, Inc. v. Phinney, No. 87-4158-S (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Wenaha Music Co. v. J & K Invs., (D. Kan. Sept. 9, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan.
1986). All three cases involved defendants' refusal to obtain or maintain performance rights
licenses despite repeated contact and threats of litigation by the American Associates of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). In all three cases, the court's finding that the de-
fendants had knowingly and wilfully infringed the copyrighted words was made only in regard
to liability and not in relation to any fee award.
266. See Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (the court briefly dis-
cusses cases from the Ninth, Third, and Fifth Circuits); Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc. v. Con-
servative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (the court cites and discusses cases from
the Ninth and Third Circuits).
267. 'Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 568 n.6.
268. 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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ble standards for awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants
under both the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act.269
The district court denied fees to the plaintiff because the defendant
had not, willfully infringed and denied fees to the defendant because of
unclean hands and failure to show that plaintiff's claims were frivolous
or brought in bad faith.27 0 All parties appealed, but the circuit court
affirmed on all counts.271
The circuit court stated that willful or bad faith infringement is re-
quired before fees can be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff under the
Lanham Act.272 The willful infringement or bad faith standard is neces-
sitated by the language in the Lanham Act that fees may be awarded
only in "exceptional" cases.2 73  As for the Copyright Act, the court
found the standard to be unclear and, after comparing the views of the
Ninth and Third Circuits, 274 held that under either standard, fees could
be denied when infringement is not deliberate and "no other factor
strongly counsels an award. ' 275 The court did not specify whether will-
ful infringement is a prerequisite, as in the Ninth Circuit, or merely that
its absence is sufficient to justify a denial of fees, as in the Third
Circuit.276
The court's discussion of the applicable standards for the prevailing
defendant illustrates the untenable consequence of judicially interposing
into 17 U.S.C. § 505 a requirement that the plaintiff proceed in bad faith
before a defendant may be awarded fees. The court first held that, in
awarding fees to the prevailing defendant under the Lanham Act, some-
269. See supra note 29 for relevant text of the fee award provision of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1117 (1988).
270. Reader's Digest, 821 F.2d at 808.
271. Id. at 809.
272. Id. at 808.
273. See supra note 30 for relevant text of the fee award provisions of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1117 (1988).
274. The court cited Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1985) and Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
275. Reader's Digest, 821 F.2d at 808; see also Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565,
568 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (The court compared the law in the Ninth, Fifth, and Third Circuits
regarding whether "deliberate" infringement is a precondition to an award of fees. As in
Reader's Digest, the court found it unnecessary to clarify the law in the D.C. Circuit, because
the losing defendant had "deliberately" infringed and such a finding would support an award
of fees under any of the cited standards.).
276. See Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 568. The court was again faced with the question of
whether an award of fees to the prevailing plaintiff is predicated on a finding of bad faith. The
court chose not to resolve the issue because the district court found the defendant to have
infringed "recklessly, willfully and knowingly," and such a finding was sufficient to justify an
award.
The issue will most likely remain unresolved until the court is faced with a case in which
fees are assessed against a defendant who acted in good faith.
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thing less than bad faith is required to satisfy the "exceptional" case stan-
dard-the case need be merely "uncommon. ' ' 277 Relying on case law
from the Ninth and Second Circuits, the court then found that under the
Copyright Act, a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees only when the
plaintiff's claims are frivolous or brought in bad faith.27 The incongru-
ous result is that fees are more readily available to the prevailing defend-
ant under the Lanham Act than under the Copyright Act. Bad faith is
not a prerequisite for an award of fees under the Lanham Act, which
limits such awards to "exceptional" cases, but is required under the
Copyright Act, which contains no such limitation in the statutory lan-
guage. It is difficult to understand how this interpretation can be recon-
ciled with the express language of the two statutes-how fees can be
more readily granted under a statute containing an express limitation on
the court's power than under a statute that merely states that the deci-
sion lies in the court's discretion.
In Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc.,2"9 the district court
identified several purposes served by 17 U.S.C. § 505:
[1] One way Congress sought to ensure that the Copyright Act would
be enforced was to provide for discretionary awards of... attorney's
fees.
[2] An award of attorney's fees helps to ensure that all litigants have
equal access to the courts to vindicate their statutory rights.
[3] It also prevents copyright infringements from going unchallenged
where the commercial value of the infringed work is small and there is
no economic incentive to challenge an infringement through expensive
litigation.
[41 In addition, an award of attorney's fees serves to penalize the los-
ing party as well as to compensate the prevailing party.
280
The principal issue in Quinto was whether a prevailing pro se liti-
gant could recover attorney's fees. The court held that awarding fees to a
pro se litigant was consistent with congressional intent and that "[t]o
deny such a litigant attorney's fees solely on the grounds that he did not
incur liability to pay attorney's fees ignores the fact that a pro se litigant
must forego other activities in order to prepare and pursue his case."' 28 '
The court went on to say that unlike the Freedom of Information
Act, under which attorney's fees are awarded only "where the suit results
in a benefit to the public, . . . neither the legislative history nor the com-
277. Reader's Digest, 821 F.2d at 809.
278. Id. (citing Roth v. Pritikin, 787 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1986); Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666
F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982)).
279. 511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981).




mon law impose any requirement that there must be a showing of public
benefit before a fee can be awarded in a copyright case."28 2
The defendant then argued that fees should not be awarded when a
good faith defense was presented or where the case presents a novel or
complex question of law.2 3 In response, the court did not rule on the
question of whether a good faith defense or the presence of novel or com-
plex questions of law would preclude an award of fees. Rather, the court
specifically found that the defendant had not acted in good faith and that
the "sole reason a novel question was presented was because the infringe-
ment was so clear-cut that the court was able to rule that infringement
had occurred as a matter of law."2 4 The court stated that "none of the
justifications for denying an award of attorney's fees is present" and
awarded plaintiff both costs and fees.2 5
H. Federal Circuit
Because the subject matter.jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit is very narrow,28 6 it is not common for the court to
hear copyright cases.2" 7 In Hughes v. Novi American, Inc., 2" the plaintiff
sued for copyright and patent infringement. The court ruled that the
plaintiff's copyright and patent were both invalid and awarded the de-
fendant costs and fees under the Patent Act and the Copyright Act.289
The court awarded fees under both the Copyright Act because the plain-
tiffs had acted in bad faith, having known before the suit was filed that
the copyright was invalid and having given false answers to interrogato-
ries."' The court did not express any general standard as to when a
court should exercise its discretion to award fees under the Copyright
Act. Although this case turned on the plaintiff's bad faith, it is not clear
from the opinion whether bad faith is a prerequisite to an award of fees
or is merely one basis for awarding fees in the Federal Circuit.
282. Id. (citations omitted). "[T]he legislative history of the F[reedom] O[fJ I[nformation]
A[ct] specifies four criteria to be considered by a court in deciding whether to award attorney's
fees, including the benefit to the public." Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 582.
285. Id.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
287. Copyright cases can only be heard in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if
the copyright claim is pendant to another claim that is properly before this court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1988).
288. 724 F.2d 122 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
289. Id. at 126. See supra note 29 for portion of the Patent Act that provides for attorney's
fees.
290. 724 F. 2d at 125.
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Additional Considerations
A. Attorney's Fees on Appeal
Section 505 does not expressly allow for or exclude attorney's fees at
the appellate level; the language of the statute merely speaks of "the
court." '29 1 All of the circuits that have addressed this question have
either expressly2 92 or impliedly2 9 3 acknowledged the availability of appel-
late attorney's fees.
In deciding whether appellate fees are recoverable in a particular
case, the circuits have generally applied the same considerations that are
applicable in the district courts. For example, in Bibbero Systems, Inc. v.
Colwell Systems, Inc.,294 the Ninth Circuit simultaneously discussed and
applied the same standard to the granting of trial court and appellate
court attorney's fees. 295 The most common reasons for denying appellate
fees are the presence of novel, complex, or substantial legal issues;296 the
good faith of the appellant in bringing the appeal;297 the fact that the
appeal was not frivolous;298 and the fact that the party seeking appellate
fees did not prevail on the appeal.2 9 9 Fees may also be granted for the
291. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for language of 17 U.S.C. § 505.
292. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have expressly acknowledged that section 505
allows for appellate fees. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]his court may make an award [of attorney's fees] for services
rendered on appeal."); Serbin, Inc. v. Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc., 381 F.2d 735, 736
(5th Cir. 1967); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 222 F.2d 488, 492-
93 (2d Cir. 1955); Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1953).
293. The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have impliedly acknowledged the
availability of appellate fees by simply addressing the merits of the fee request. See, e.g.,
Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 367 (11 th Cir. 1987); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Direc-
tory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1985); Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive
Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1288 (6th Cir. 1974); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc.,
193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951).
294. 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990).
295. Id. at 1108-09.
296. Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986); Kamakazi
Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 231 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982); Monogram Mod-
els, 492 F.2d at 1288; Edward B. Marks, 222 F.2d at 493; Overman, 205 F.2d at 524.
297. Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1987);
Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1435; Edward B. Marks, 222"F.2d at 493; Overman, 205 F.2d at 524.
298. See Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 980; Lifshitz, 806 F.2d at 1435; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1986); See v. Durang, 7.11 F.2d 141,
144 (9th Cir. 1983); Kamakazi, 684 F.2d at 231 n.6; Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1132 (9th
Cir. 1979); Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1288; Ideal Toy Corp. v. J-Cey Doll Co., 290 F.2d
710, 711 (2d Cir. 1961).
299. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1327 (2d Cir. 1989); Russell, 612 F.2d at
1123; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,, 106 F.2d 45, 55 (2d. Cir. 1939); see also
Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d at 1157 (the defendant/appellee should not be penalized for de-
fending an appeal); Monogram Models, 492 F.2d at 1288 (the prevailing party's receipt of large
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opposite reasons.3° Consideration of whether to award appellate fees is
not necessarily limited to facts surrounding the appeal; the appellate
court may consider the presence of bad faith at the trial level in granting
appellate fees.
30 1
There is a considerable number of cases in which appellate courts
have awarded or denied attorney's fees without giving any reason or dis-
cuss the issue. These cases tend to be older cases from circuits that have
since adopted detailed and restrictive standards 30 2 or from circuits that
have not yet adopted a comprehensive standard.03
An additional issue is the question of which court, district or cir-
cuit, may award appellate fees. The Second, the Fifth, and the Eleventh
Circuits have addressed this issue and have arrived at different conclu-
sions. In Roth v. Pritikin, 30 the Second Circuit reversed a district court's
award of fees for work done on a petition for certiorari, holding that only
the Supreme Court could award fees for work done on such a petition
and that only the circuit court could award fees for work done at the
circuit court level. 3 5 The rationale is that only the court to which the
work was presented can adequately judge whether fees are appropri-
damage award by district court makes appellate fees unnecessary); Edward B. Marks, 222 F.2d
at 493 (the unsuccessful plaintiff/appellant should not be penalized).
300. See Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 950 (2d Cir. 1958) (appellate fees
awarded because of insubstantial nature of contentions on appeal).
301. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1985)
(award of trial level fees affirmed and appellate fees granted because of plaintiff/appellant's bad
faith claims); Boucher, 253 F.2d at 950 (plaintiff/appellee awarded appellate fees because of the
"deliberate" nature of defendant's infringement); Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 228 F.2d 221,
222 (2d Cir. 1955) (defendant/appellee granted appellate fees because there was "no basis for
the plaintiff's claim of plagiarism and unfair competition").
302. Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 165 F.2d 784, 785 (2d Cir. 1948) (fees
awarded to defendant/appellee without discussion); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) [hereinafter Sheldon I] (fees awarded to plaintiff/appellant
without discussion).
303. Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir.
1985) (plaintiff/appellee awarded fees without discussion); Herbert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218,
224 (1st Cir. 1984) (appellate fees denied without explanation); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Con-
temporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162, 169 (1st Cir. 1951) (appellate fees were awarded to plain-
tiff/appellee without discussion).
304. 787 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1986).
305. Id. at 58-59. But see Sheldon I, supra note 302, at 56, in which the circuit court
granted appellate fees but remanded for the district court to determine the amount. Sheldon I
established that the defendant had infringed plaintiff's copyright. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939) [hereinafter Sheldon II] established the amount of
damages and attorney's fees.
Sheldon I and Roth are not necessarily inconsistent. In Sheldon I, the circuit court deter-
mined that appellate fees were appropriate and remanded for a determination of the amount.
The case already needed to be returned to the district court to consider damages, so fees could
be assessed at the same time. By contrast, the district court in Roth decided on its own that
appellate fees should be awarded and set the amount.
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ate.306 In contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the
district court should consider the issue of appellate fees and, if awarded,
assess the appropriate amount after the conclusion of the appellate pro-
cess.30 7 No convincing reason is given for this procedure.308
B. Findings of Fact to Support Award or Nonaward
Another issue to consider is whether a district court must enter find-
ings of fact to support its award or nonaward of attorney's fees. The
Third,3°9 Ninth,310 Eleventh, 31' and Federal312 Circuits have held that a
district court must enter supporting findings of fact when exercising its
discretion under section 505. If it is not known why the district court
granted or denied fees, "meaningful review" is precluded, 313 because it is
impossible to determine whether the district court properly exercised its
discretion. 314 Findings of fact have been held to be necessary not only
when fees are granted, but also when fees are denied.31 5
If findings of fact are not included, the matter is usually vacated and
remanded for further consideration and entry of supporting factual find-
306. Roth, 787 F.2d at 58. As a corollary, the Eighth Circuit has held that the question of
whether attorney's fees should be awarded for work performed at the trial level is not their
decision, but lies in the discretion of the district court. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th
Cir. 1962).
307. Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 367 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Serbin, Inc. v. Key West
Hand Print Fabrics, Inc., 381 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir. 1967)).
308. The only rationale given by the Serbin court states, "We deem it proper that such an
allowance [for appellate fees] be considered by the district court rather than this court, and
direct that that court consider an application therefor ... upon the going down of our man-
date." 381 F.2d at 736.
309. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1986).
310. McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir. 1987); Cooling Sys. &
Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Frank Music Corp. v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), in which the court affirmed an
award of fees to the prevailing plaintiff without stating or considering the district court's fac-
tual basis for the award. The only rationale given was that plaintiffs "may be awarded fees
simply by virtue of prevailing." Id. at 1556. The circuit court, however, held that "the district
court erred in failing to explain the basis for the amount awarded" and remanded for further
consideration of the amount of the award. Id. (emphasis added).
311. Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987);
Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 367 (11th Cir. 1987).
312. Hughes v. Novi Am., Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 124 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
313. Id.
314. Sherry Mfg., 822 F.2d at 1034 ("[I]n order for this court to discharge its responsibility
to review the judgment of the district court.... we must be able to ascertain the basis upon
which the district court exercised its discretion." Id. ); Casella, 820 F.2d at 367 ("[W]e are...
unable to provide meaningful appellate review."); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 154
(3d Cir. 1986) ("Because we are not aware of the basis on which the district court ruled... we
are unable to perform our appellate function, and therefore must remand.").
315. See, e.g., Casella, 820 F.2d at 367; Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156.
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ings.316 However, in one case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed an award of
fees without any findings despite its requirement that the district court
enter supporting findings of fact, because the record contained "sufficient
indicia of bad faith and frivolity to justify the district court's holding. ' 31 *
Given the fact that the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits both have very
lenient standards for awarding fees, it is noteworthy that they have not
arrived at identical positions when it comes to the requirement of find-
ings of fact. In separate cases, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly re-
quired the district court to state its reasons for denying fees318 and for
granting fees.31 9 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has required findings of
fact only as to the reasonableness of the amount and not as to whether
fees are awarded.320 It appears that the district court need not enter find-
ings of fact to support an award of fees in the Fifth Circuit. This may be
because of the circuit's standard of "routinely" awarding fees.321
The Ninth Circuit has rendered decisions on this subject that are not
wholly consistent with one another. In McCulloch v. Price,322 decided in
1987, the court reversed and remanded an award of fees to the prevailing
plaintiff because "[t]he district court did not make a finding concerning
the basis for the award of attorney's fees.", 323 In Frank Music Corp. v.
Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer, Inc.,3 24 decided two years later, the court re-
manded an award of fees granted to the prevailing plaintiff solely on the
reasonableness of the amount. If the district court entered findings as to
why fees should be awarded, its findings were not mentioned in the cir-
cuit court's opinion.325 However, in that same case, the court stated,
"Plaintiffs in copyright actions may be awarded attorney's fees simply by
virtue of prevailing in the action .... 326 It may no longer be necessary
for district courts in the Ninth Circuit to enter findings of fact as to the
316. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir. 1987); Sherry
Mfg., 822 F.2d at 1034; Casella, 820 F.2d at 367; Lieb, 788 F.2d at 158.
317. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart, 777 F.2d 485, 493 (9th Cir. 1985).
318. Casella, 820 F.2d at 367.
319. Sherry Mfg., 822 F.2d at 1034.
320. Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1985).
321. See supra Part III for a discussion of the standard for awarding fees in the Fifth
Circuit.
322. 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987).
323. Id. at 323.
324. 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989).
325. In an earlier proceeding, Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772
F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Frank Music I], the circuit court affirmed the district
court's finding that the defendant had infringed plaintiff's copyright. In Frank Music I. the
court affirmed as not clearly erroneous the district court's finding that the infringement was
not willful. Id. at 515. The latter case, Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Frank Music II], dealt with the joint and several
liability of the two codefendants, damages, and attorney's fees.
326. Frank Music II, 886 F.2d at 1556.
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awarding of fees to a prevailing plaintiff. Such findings would still be
necessary to support the reasonableness of the amount awarded and pre-
sumably would be necessary to support an award of fees to a prevailing
defendant, since defendants are subject to a much more stringent
standard.327
No circuit has expressly stated that findings of fact are not required,
but appellate courts have affirmed district court decisions without stating
whether the district court had entered any findings to support its deci-
sion. 32 There are also many examples of district courts summarily
granting or denying fees without discussion,329 and there is at least one
example of a circuit court granting fees on appeal without giving any
reason.
330
C. The Preclusive Effect of 17 U.S.C. § 412
Under the current version of the Copyright Act, the validity of a
copyright is not dependent on registration with the Copyright Office.3 31
However, section 412332 serves as a bar, with certain narrow excep-
tions, 333 to the recovery of statutory damages and attorney's fees for in-
fringement of unregistered works. The rationale of the section is to
eliminate "special statutory remedies unless the owner has, by registra-
327. See supra section II(A)(2) for a discussion of the standard for awarding fees in the
Ninth 'Circuit.
328. Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145, 150 (7th Cir.
1985); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1982);
Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1288 (6th Cir. 1974).
329. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D. Kan. 1987);
Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653, 657 (D. Kan. 1986); Chess Music, Inc. v.
Tadych, 467 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
330. Rockford Map Publishers, 768 F.2d at 150.
331. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... ." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
"[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection." Id. § 408(a).
332. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1988) states in its entirety,
In any action under this title, other than an action instituted under section
41 l(b), no award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees, as provided by sections
504 and 505, shall be made for-
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced
before the effective date of its registration; or
(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the
work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is.
made within three months after the first publication of the work.
333. The two exceptions contained in the language of section 4.12 allow recovery of statu-
tory damages or attorney's fees if 1) the action was instituted under section 41 l(b), that is,
where the "work consist[s] of sounds, images, or both, the first fixation of which is made
simultaneously with its transmission, or 2) registration of a copyright work occurs within three
months of its first publication. 17 U.S.C. §§ 411 (b), 412 (1988), respectively.
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tion, made a public record of his copyright claim. ' 334 The purpose is to
encourage or induce voluntary registration in a practical way. 3
Section 412 is strictly construed 336 and bars the party claiming in-
fringement from collecting fees or statutory damages, no matter how
strong the facts of the case militate for an award of fees or statutory
damages.3 37 However, by its language, the section does not prohibit the
recovery of fees when the party accused of infringing the unregistered
copyright prevails at trial. The relevant language states that "no award
of statutory damages or of attorney's fees ... shall be made for ... any
infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced before the
effective date of its registration. 3 3  Therefore, if the copyright owner
fails to prove infringement, the alleged infringer who prevails at trial is
not precluded by this section from receiving attorney's fees.3 39 This con-
clusion comports with the stated purpose of the section-to encourage
voluntary registration. To bar recovery of fees by a nonowner would not
serve to encourage voluntary copyright registration, as only a copyright
owner, or his assignee, can register a copyright. 34
Section 412 is the current version of the Act and has no counterpart
in prior versions. The reason for this is that under prior versions of the
Act, registration was a prerequisite for copyright protection of published
works,341 so there was no need to encourage or "induce" voluntary
registration.
The availability of costs342 and other remedies such as actual dam-
ages and injunctive relief is unaffected by this section. 43 But, because of
334. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5774..
335. Id.; see also Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 533, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
336. When the requirements of section 412 have not been satisfied, the decision to award
fees is no longer discretionary-fees are barred as a matter of law. See Robert R. Jones Assoc.
v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 281-82 n.7 (6th Cir. 1988).
337. S.A.S. Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 831 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
338. 17 U.S.C. § 412(1) (1988). See supra note 332 for complete text of section 412.
339. Streeter v. Rolfe, 491 F. Supp. 416, 422 (W.D. La. 1980).
340. "At any time during the subsistence of copyright ... the owner of copyright or of any
exclusive right in the work may obtain registration .... " 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988) (emphasis
added).
341. Section 13 of the prior Act required, as part of the registration process, copies of the
work be deposited in the Copyright Office. Section 14 of the prior Act states that if the copies
are not promptly deposited in the Copyright Office, the Register of Copyrights, upon actual
notice, may require the proprietor to make the necessary deposits. If that demand goes un-
heeded for three months, the proprietor of the copyright "shall be liable to a fine of $100...
and the copyright shall be void." 17 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) (repealed 1976).
342. Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 533, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
343. The damages available are limited to those available under the common law, such as
actual damages, lost profits, and injunctive relief. The remedies precluded by this section are
the statutorily created remedies. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 158, reprinted
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the difficulty of proving actual damages in a given situation, this section
may, in effect, preclude recovery of monetary damages. 3" The cases in
which infringement has been found and in which attorney's fees or statu-





One of the benefits of having adopted a standard for awarding fees
under the Copyright Act, no matter what that standard might be, is the
consistency and predictability that such adoption provides. Although
the issue of attorney's fees is not considered until after the merits of the
case are decided, consistency and predictability of results are desirable in
that they encourage settlement.
However, the benefit provided by consistent and predictable rulings
is outweighed by a larger danger, when those "predictable" and "consis-
tent" rulings are contrary to the proper interpretation of the law. As has
been shown, the standards of the Second and Ninth Circuits are espe-
cially indefensible when closely scrutinized. The standards of the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, though less objectionable, are nonetheless con-
trary to congressional intent.
The standard expressed by the Third Circuit comes closest to the
letter and spirit of the law. It is this standard that should be followed by
those circuits that have not yet adopted a standard; those circuits that
have adopted a contrary standard should rethink their positions in light
of the Third Circuit test.
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5774 ("The remedies for infringement
presently available at common law should continue to be apply to these works under the stat-
ute, but they should not be given special statutory remedies.").
344. Statutory damages are often awarded when it is difficult or impossible to prove actual
damages or lost profits. See, e.g., Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592
F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1978); Bell v. Pro Arts, Inc., 511 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
829 (1975); Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Lauratex Textile
Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Key West Hand Print
Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.
1967); Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D. Or. 1940).
345. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assoc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Evans
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949
(1986); Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Assoc., 764 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1985);
Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, 403 F.2d
1486 (1 1th Cir. 1990); N.B.C. Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Broadcast Information Servs.,
717 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Colo. 1988); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 533
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Whelan II, supra note 166; Johnson v. University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321
(D. Va. 1985); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252
(D. Neb. 1982).
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